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INTRODUCTION
Approximately 2 to 5 percent of the American student population
qualifies as both gifted and learning disabled.1 These students,
labeled by educators as “twice-exceptional,” generally demonstrate
superior cognitive ability, yet also present profound weaknesses in
seemingly basic skills.2 This disconnect in twice-exceptional
students’ abilities produces great difficulties for America’s public
schools.3
Twice-exceptional students, as a result of their disability, can
generally qualify for special education services under the federal
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004
(IDEIA).4 Once a student qualifies for services under the IDEIA, he
is entitled to receive a Free and Appropriate Public Education
(FAPE).5 The IDEIA defines a FAPE as an education that is
“provided at public expense ... meet[s] [state] standards ... [is]
appropriate ... and [is] provided in conformity with [a student’s
individualized education program].”6 Given the general nature of
this statutory guidance, the courts have been largely responsible for
determining what constitutes a FAPE.7 And, while the courts have
created relatively clear standards, applying these standards to
twice-exceptional students has proven problematic.8
1. See MONTGOMERY CTY. PUB. SCH., A GUIDEBOOK FOR TWICE EXCEPTIONAL STUDENTS:
SUPPORTING THE ACHIEVEMENT OF GIFTED STUDENTS WITH SPECIAL NEEDS C-1 (2004),
http://www.wrightslaw.com/info/2e.guidebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/TRK8-7AFZ] [hereinafter
TWICE EXCEPTIONAL GUIDEBOOK].
2. BEVERLY A. TRAIL, TWICE-EXCEPTIONAL GIFTED CHILDREN: UNDERSTANDING,
TEACHING, AND COUNSELING GIFTED STUDENTS 1-3 (Lacy Compton ed., 2011).
3. See NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, THE TWICE-EXCEPTIONAL DILEMMA 1 (2006) [hereinafter
TWICE-EXCEPTIONAL DILEMMA].
4. See infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
5. See infra Part I.B.2.
6. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446,
118 Stat. 2653-54.
7. See PETER W.D. WRIGHT & PAMELA DARR WRIGHT, WRIGHTSLAW: SPECIAL EDUCATION
LAW 51 n.23 (2d ed. 2006).
8. See Carrie Lynn Bailey & Valija C. Rose, Examining Teachers’ Perceptions of Twice
Exceptional Students: Overview of a Qualitative Exploration, VISTAS ONLINE 9-10 (2011),
https://www.counseling.org/resources/library/VISTAS/2011-V-Online/Article_07.pdf [https://
perma.cc/44CJ-HMQ3].
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Consider the following case: Per Hovem is a twice-exceptional
high school senior in the Klein Independent School District who
qualifies for services under the IDEIA.9 He has superior cognitive
ability, as shown through intelligence testing, and he makes above-
average grades in his general education courses.10 Yet, despite this,
Per’s writing ability is subpar, falling around a second-grade level.11
In fact, Per and his teachers assert that he takes multiple hours to
write paragraphs and fill out one-page forms.12 Despite these
deficiencies, however, Per can read and comprehend at an age-
appropriate level.13 Given Per’s mix of abilities, what supports
should the Klein Independent School District provide in order to
meet its obligation to provide Per with a FAPE? Would minor
accommodations, such as extra time on written assignments,
suffice? Or is the school district required to do more?
In making its decision in Per’s case, the Fifth Circuit applied the
prevailing standard at the time, Board of Education of Hendrick
Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, which held that a school
district met its FAPE obligation when a student’s educational
program was “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive
educational benefits.”14 Since Per advanced grade-to-grade in his
general education courses, the Fifth Circuit held that minimal
accommodations and services were enough to provide Per with a
FAPE.15 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit refused to consider arguments
that the school district failed to meet its FAPE requirements based
on Per’s inability to meet his full academic potential.16
The Fifth Circuit’s holding represented a typical decision under
the Rowley standard.17 Nevertheless, many special education and
disability advocates suggested that such results were problematic.18
9. This discussion is based on twice-exceptional student Per Hovem. See Klein Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Hovem, 690 F.3d 390, 392 (5th Cir. 2012).
10. See id.
11. See Klein Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Hovem, 745 F. Supp. 2d 700, 751 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
12. See id. at 718-19, 721.
13. See id. at 751.
14. 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982).
15. See Hovem, 690 F.3d at 398-400.
16. See id. at 398.
17. See infra Part I.C.1.
18. See Emma Brown, Supreme Court to Decide: What Level of Education Do Public
Schools Legally Owe to Students with Disabilities?, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.
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These advocates claimed that the Rowley standard was too lenient,
allowing school districts to satisfy FAPE requirements without fully
addressing students’ needs.19 Thus, these advocates called for the
creation of a more rigorous standard—one that would require school
districts to do more for their disabled students.20
Advocates’ pleas were seemingly answered when the Supreme
Court handed down its 2017 decision in Endrew F. v. Douglas
County School District RE-1.21 Though Endrew dealt with a “tradi-
tionally” disabled, non-twice-exceptional student, Endrew clarified
the Rowley decision and, by most accounts, raised the FAPE
standard by placing a greater emphasis on the student’s individual
abilities.22 Specifically, Endrew held that a student’s educational
program should be “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make
progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”23 Yet,
despite advocates’ general belief that Endrew will raise the FAPE
standard for disabled students as a whole, there is some evidence
that the new standard will have only a slight impact on twice-
exceptional students specifically.24
To address this claim, this Note will proceed in three main parts.
Part I describes the twice-exceptional student population in greater
detail. In addition, this Part discusses education law generally,
highlighting federal special education law, the FAPE standard, and
gifted education. Part II explains why the Endrew decision may not
impact twice-exceptional students to the same level it could affect
nongifted, disabled students. Part III then suggests that twice-
exceptional students should receive greater protection. This Part
argues that amending the IDEIA is unlikely to be successful.
Additionally, it proposes that the states individually adopt Gifted
Individualized Education Provisions to supplement students’
protection under the IDEIA and ensure that twice-exceptional
washingtonpost.com/local/education/supreme-court-to-decide-what-level-of-education-do-
public-schools-legally-owe-to-students-with-disabilities/2017/01/10/3e8e14ca-d690-11e6-9f9f-




21. See 137 S. Ct. 988, 999-1000 (2017); infra Part II.A.
22. Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999.
23. Id. (emphasis added).
24. See infra Part II.B.
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students’ weaknesses and strengths are both appropriately consid-
ered.
I. FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
To qualify for services under the IDEIA, a student needs to fit
into one of thirteen disability categories listed in 20 U.S.C. §
1401(3)(A)(i).25 Notably, “twice-exceptional” is not a listed disability
category.26 Nevertheless, twice-exceptional students can (and do)
qualify for services so long as their disability falls within the
IDEIA’s disability categories and the student can demonstrate that,
as a result of the disability, he “needs special education and related
services.”27 Additionally, given that twice-exceptional students are
gifted or cognitively superior in at least some academic areas, twice-
exceptional students may also qualify for a school’s gifted program-
ming.28
Because twice-exceptional students present both disability and
giftedness, their educational needs stretch across different educa-
tional laws and policy areas.29 Thus, to provide a complete overview
of the legal landscape, this Part will provide a basic introduction to
both federal special education law as well as relevant federal and
state gifted education programs. 
25. Andrew M.I. Lee, The 13 Disability Categories Under IDEA, UNDERSTOOD, https://
www.understood.org/en/school-learning/special-services/special-education-basics/conditions-
covered-under-idea [https://perma.cc/6GQJ-AYAL].
26. The disability categories include “intellectual disabilities, hearing impairments ...
speech or language impairments, visual impairments ... serious emotional disturbance ...
orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific
learning disabilities.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (2012).
27. WRIGHT & WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 21; U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
(Q&A) ON U.S. SUPREME COURT CASE DECISION ENDREW F. V. DOUGLAS COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT RE-1 8 (Dec. 7, 2017), https://sites.ed.gov/idea/files/qa-endrewcase-12-07-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DAD3-2G2N] [hereinafter Q&A].




29. See infra Part I.A.
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A. What Is a Twice-Exceptional Student?
The term “twice-exceptional student” (at its most basic level)
refers to students who are both gifted and disabled.30 In other
words, these students meet traditional qualifications for gifted-
ness—that is, high cognition and potential for high achievement—
but these students also qualify as disabled under the IDEIA.31
Due to this unique spread of giftedness and disability, twice-
exceptional students are often overlooked and can be difficult to
identify.32 In fact, twice-exceptional students have been described by
educators as “the most misjudged, misunderstood, and neglected
segment of the student population.”33 Commentators illustrate the
difficulties of identifying twice-exceptional students by dividing
these students into three general categories: (1) students whose
giftedness largely masks their disability, (2) students whose dis-
ability masks their giftedness, and (3) students whose giftedness
and disability cancel each other out, making these students appear
“average.”34
These identification difficulties matter because twice-exceptional
students face great difficulty in the classroom if their divergent
needs are not met.35 For instance, if a student’s giftedness is
overlooked he may become disinterested or face feelings of frustra-
tion; likewise, if a student’s disability is overlooked, he may become
overwhelmed and develop a low self-esteem.36 Moreover, research
suggests that these feelings, if not addressed, may prompt a twice-
exceptional student to act out and develop other behavioral issues
30. Kim Millman, Comment, An Argument for Cadillacs Instead of Chevrolets: How the
Legal System Can Facilitate the Needs of the Twice-Exceptional Child, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 455,
456-57 (2007).
31. Parents, educators, and courts use the term “twice-exceptional” slightly differently.
Since this Note discusses the application of Endrew, it will employ a narrow definition: a
student who qualifies for services under the IDEIA and has demonstrated capacity for high
cognition.
32. See Leah M. Christensen, Law Students Who Learn Differently: A Narrative Case
Study of Three Law Students with Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD), 21 J.L. & HEALTH 45, 52
(2008).
33. JOANNE RAND WHITMORE & C. JUNE MAKER, INTELLECTUAL GIFTEDNESS IN DISABLED
PERSONS 204 (1985).
34. Millman, supra note 30, at 478; see also Rosen, supra note 28.
35. See Rosen, supra note 28.
36. See Millman, supra note 30, at 480.
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in the classroom—resulting in a potential loss of instructional time
for both the student and his peers.37
Perhaps most problematic, however, are these students’ academic
progress. A twice-exceptional student, due to his giftedness, often
has the ability (at least in some academic areas) to learn at an
accelerated pace.38 And, unlike “traditionally” disabled students,
twice-exceptional students can often mask their deficits by develop-
ing coping mechanisms.39 Thus, two general problems can easily
arise if a student’s education programming is not tailored correctly:
(1) a student may experience regression (or stagnation) in an area
of strength if he is not pushed appropriately and (2) a student may
pass grade-to-grade without learning fundamental skills if he uses
his gifts to mask his deficits.40
Twice-exceptional student classroom placement also proves
difficult.41 Within a traditional public school environment, disabled
students have two general placement options: mainstream class-
rooms (general education classrooms with nondisabled peers) or
self-contained classrooms (classrooms that contain only disabled
students).42 If neither of these options proves wholly appropriate, a
student may also receive intermediary “push-in” or “pull-out”
services, where a student receives a mixture of mainstream and
special education.43 Given twice-exceptional students’ cognitive
37. See id.
38. See, e.g., Downington Area Sch. Dist. v. K.D., No. 1485, 2017 WL 877316, at *1 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. Mar. 6, 2017); TRAIL, supra note 2, at 26.
39. See Micaela Bracamonte, Twice-Exceptional Students: Who Are They and What Do
They Need?, TWICE-EXCEPTIONAL NEWSL. (Mar. 2010), http://www.2enewsletter.com/article_
2e_what_are_they.html [https://perma.cc/GSE7-NBXD].
40. See Dawn Beckley, Gifted and Learning Disabled: Twice Exceptional Students, NAT’L
RES. CTR. ON GIFTED & TALENTED NEWSL., (Renzulli Ctr. for Creativity, Gifted Educ., & Talent
Dev., Storrs, Conn. 1998), https://nrcgt.uconn.edu/newsletters/spring984/ [https://perma.cc/
ST86-F3S6]; Twice-Exceptional Students, NAT’L ASS’N FOR GIFTED CHILDREN, https://
www.nagc.org/resources-publications/resources-parents/twice-exceptional-students [https://
perma.cc/8FHM-BCS8].
41. See Beth Arky, Twice-Exceptional Kids: Both Gifted and Challenged, CHILD MIND
INST., https://childmind.org/article/twice-exceptional-kids-both-gifted-and-challenged/ [https://
perma.cc/BMN7-GRC8].
42. See, e.g., Grace Chen, Understanding Self-Contained Classrooms in Public Schools,
PUB. SCH. REV. (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.publicschoolreview.com/blog/understanding-self-
contained-classrooms-in-public-schools [https://perma.cc/7CTJ-2CG9].
43. Generally speaking, students receive push-in services when they spend time in the
self-contained, special-education environment, but get “pushed-into” the mainstream
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abilities and IDEIA requirements that a student be placed in the
least restrictive environment,44 many twice-exceptional students
participate primarily in the mainstream environment.45
B. An Overview of Federal Special Education Law
Special education is regulated through federal law.46 All states
currently receive funding through the federal IDEIA, meaning that
the states must meet minimum requirements, such as providing
disabled students with a FAPE.47 The following discussion will track
the history of this law as well as discuss its current provisions.
1. Special Education Law Between 1960 and 2004
Beginning in the mid-1960s, Congress began to develop legisla-
tion to support disabled students.48 These early legislative efforts
resulted in the creation of federal grant programs.49 The grant
programs were meant to motivate the states to dedicate resources
environment for certain classes or activities; conversely, students receive pull-out services
when they spend time in the general education environment, but get “pulled-out” for extra




44. The “least restrictive environment” provision requires that schools educate disabled
students with nondisabled students “[t]o the maximum extent appropriate.” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(a)(5)(A) (2012).
45. See Bracamonte, supra note 39 (suggesting that exclusive special education is not
appropriate for twice-exceptional students); Barbara Probst, Finding a School that Fits,
DAVIDSON INST. (2006), https://www.davidsongifted.org/Search-Database/entry/A10439
[https: //perma.cc/GEZ9-KUFU]; TWICE EXCEPTIONAL GUIDEBOOK, supra note 1, at K-1 to K-2
(suggesting that twice-exceptional students are typically mainstreamed, especially in later
grades).
46. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2012).
47. See KYRIE E. DRAGOO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44624, THE INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT (IDEA) FUNDING: A PRIMER 1, 17-18, Table 2 (2018) [hereinafter
IDEA PRIMER].
48. See WRIGHT & WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 13-15.
49. See Education of the Handicapped Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-230, §§ 611-12, 84 Stat.
178-79; Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, § 203(a)-(b), 79
Stat. 28-29.
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to students with disabilities.50 Despite congressional intent,
however, the grant programs proved largely ineffective.51 In fact,
approximately ten years after the passage of the first grant
program, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, a congres-
sional investigation revealed “that of the more than 8 million
children ... with handicapping conditions requiring special education
and related services, only 3.9 million such children [were] receiving
an appropriate education [, and additionally] 1.75 million handi-
capped children ... receiv[ed] no educational services at all.”52
In response to these staggering statistics, Congress renewed its
efforts to provide educational opportunities to disabled students and
passed the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975
(EAHCA).53 Unlike the previous grant programs, the EAHCA
offered federal funds to the states only if a state committed to
comply with the conditions of the Act.54
The EAHCA was amended several times.55 Each amendment
expanded the scope of the law and offered disabled students further
protections.56 In 1990, the EAHCA was reauthorized, and Congress
renamed it the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).57
Throughout the 1990s, Congress continued to amend the IDEA.58
Again, these amendments continued to expand the scope of the Act,
50. See Lex Frieden, School Vouchers and Students with Disabilities, NAT’L COUNCIL ON
DISABILITY (Apr. 15, 2003), https://www.ncd.gov/publications/2003/April152003 [https://
perma. cc/Q9T8-7BJJ].
51. Unlike modern special education funding, these grant programs did not include
“specific mandates” for the funds, which likely contributed to the programs’ failure. Id.
52. S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 8 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1432
(emphasis added).
53. See Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 180-
81 (1982).
54. See Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 612,
89 Stat. 780-82.
55. See Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-457, 100
Stat. 1145; Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-199, 97
Stat. 1357.
56. See History: Twenty-Five Years of Progress in Educating Children with Disabilities
Through IDEA, U.S. OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUC. PROGRAMS (July 19, 2007), https://
www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/leg/idea/history.pdf [https://perma.cc/44VT-U4R2].
57. See id.
58. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. 105-17,
111 Stat. 37; Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-119, 105 Stat. 587.
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most notably shifting the focus from disabled students’ access to the
school building to these students’ access to the general education
curriculum.59
The most recent reauthorization occurred in 2004.60 As part of
this reauthorization, Congress renamed the statute, calling it the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004
(IDEIA),61 and continued to expand the law by providing an in-
creased focus on accountability and improved student outcomes.62
2. The IDEIA
The IDEIA is an “ambitious” law.63 Like its earlier iterations, the
IDEIA provides states with federal funds earmarked for disabled
students so long as the state commits to complying with the IDEIA’s
statutory requirements.64
Though complex, the IDEIA is best understood as a law that sets
forth a comprehensive procedural framework for the purpose of
ensuring disabled students’ substantive rights.65 The right to a
FAPE is a critical substantive right protected by the IDEIA.66
The FAPE requirement has been in place since the passage of the
EAHCA.67 Despite the FAPE requirement’s long existence in federal
law, however, the language describing FAPE has not meaningfully
changed.68 Thus, pre-IDEIA cases (such as Rowley) remain relevant.
The IDEIA currently describes FAPE as:
59. See Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192
(1982).
60. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
446, 118 Stat. 2647; IDEA PRIMER, supra note 47, at 10.
61. See Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647.
62. See WRIGHT & WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 15-16.
63. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 999 (2017).
64. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (2012).
65. See Back to School on Civil Rights, WRIGHTSLAW, https://www.wrightslaw.com/law/
reports/IDEA_Compliance_1.htm [https://perma.cc/GP2G-7KFG].
66. Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 993.
67. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 2(c), 89
Stat. 775.
68. Compare id., with Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-446, § 602, 118 Stat. 2653-54. Despite the twenty-nine-year gap, the current
FAPE definition is almost identical to its 1975 counterpart.
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[S]pecial education and related services that— 
(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervi-
sion and direction, and without charge;
(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency; 
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or
secondary school education in the State involved; and 
(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education
program required under section 614(d).69
Commentators note that the IDEIA’s FAPE requirement is nonspe-
cific.70 Thus, FAPE’s definition is largely drawn from case law.71
That said, the statutory definition does provide some guidance.
Specifically, the IDEIA’s definition requires that special education
be “provided in conformity with the individualized education
program,” or “IEP.”72 Importantly, an IEP is the main avenue for
determining whether a student has been denied a FAPE.73
An IEP is a written document that is created by a student’s school
team (generally consisting of a regular education teacher, a special
education teacher, and school or district administrators) and his
parent or guardian.74 An IEP is a document that is tailored to the
specific student for whom it is written, though it must comport with
§ 1414(d) of the IDEIA.75 The document contains a statement of the
student’s current level of academic and functional performance and,
based on this, lists out specific goals for that student and the var-
ious special education and related services that the student will
69. § 602(9)(A)-(D), 118 Stat. at 2653-54.
70. See, e.g., WRIGHT & WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 51 n.23; Grant Simon, “Hardly Be Said
to Offer an Education at All”: Endrew and Its Impact on Special Education Mediation, 2018
J. DISP. RESOL. 133, 137-38. The federal regulations include an equally vague definition. See
34 C.F.R. § 300.17 (2017).
71. See WRIGHT & WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 51 n.23.
72. § 602(9)(D), 118 Stat. at 2654 (emphasis added).
73. See Millman, supra note 30, at 466; Jamie Lynne Thomas, Comment, Decoding
Eligibility Under the IDEA: Interpretations of “Adversely Affect Educational Performance,” 38
CAMPBELL L. REV. 73, 78 (2016).
74. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B) (2012); Who Writes the School-Age IEP?, CTR. AUTISM
RES. (July 5, 2016), https://www.carautismroadmap.org/who-writes-the-school-age-iep/
[https://perma.cc/L5LJ-GT6L].
75. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(14).
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receive.76 An IEP is updated annually and therefore changes and
develops as the student progresses through his schooling.77
C. The FAPE Standard 
Despite its length and complexity, the IDEIA provides only
minimal guidance to the states in regard to the FAPE require-
ments.78 Thus, school districts largely rely on the courts’ interpreta-
tion of the FAPE standard.79
The United States Supreme Court first reviewed the FAPE stan-
dard in Rowley.80 Administrative law judges and federal courts
relied on Rowley’s interpretation of the FAPE standard for thirty-
five years.81 Then, in 2017, the Court readdressed and clarified the
FAPE standard in Endrew.82 Importantly, Endrew did not overturn
Rowley.83 The Court did signal some alterations to the Rowley stan-
dard for some students, however.84 The next two Sections will
provide a brief overview of Rowley and Endrew and, more impor-
tantly, will discuss how the Court modified the FAPE standard.
1. Standard Adopted in Rowley
At issue in Rowley was whether plaintiff Amy Rowley—a deaf
first-grade student who was succeeding academically—was receiv-
ing a FAPE.85 Amy’s parents believed that she was denied a FAPE
76. See, e.g., Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 994 (2017).
77. See id.
78. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
79. See WRIGHT & WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 51 n.23.
80. Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 994.
81. See, e.g., Kathleen Conn, Rowley and Endrew F.: Discerning the Outer Bounds of
FAPE?, 345 EDUC. L. REP. 597, 597 (2017).
82. See L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., OAH No. 2017041138 26, 27 (Cal. Office of Admin.
Hearings Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.dgs.ca.gov/OAH/Case-Types/Special-Education/Services/
-/media/Divisions/OAH/Special-Education/SE-Decisions/2017---November/2017041138.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W39Y-JA6E].
83. See Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 998-1001; Ruth Colker, Did the Fry Decision Under the
IDEA Overturn Rowley?, 46 J.L. & EDUC. 443, 443 (2017).
84. See infra Part II.B.
85. See Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 184-
87 (1982).
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because her IEP offered a hearing aid (and other services) rather
than a sign-language interpreter.86
To resolve the issue, Amy’s parents began due process proceed-
ings.87 Both an independent examiner and the New York Commis-
sioner of Education held that Amy was not denied a FAPE.88 Amy’s
parents then brought an action in United States District Court,
which held that Amy was denied a FAPE.89 Specifically, the court
found that even though Amy “perform[ed] better than the average
child in her class and ... advanc[ed] easily from grade to grade,” that
Amy “underst[ood] considerably less of what [went] on in class than
she could if she were not deaf.”90 The court held that this “disparity
between Amy’s achievement and her potential” was enough to con-
stitute a FAPE violation.91 Thus, the district court held that a
student was denied a FAPE if his IEP allowed disparities between
his performance and his potential.92 The school district appealed the
ruling, but the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.93
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit—
holding that Amy was not denied a FAPE.94 The Court explicitly
rejected the idea that a FAPE required a student’s full potential to
be realized and further noted that states did not need to ensure
equality of services or opportunities between its nondisabled and
disabled students.95
Though the Supreme Court restricted its analysis to the specific
factual scenario in Rowley, future courts derived a general standard
from the decision: namely, that in order to comply with its FAPE
86. See id. at 184-85.
87. Due process is a procedural safeguard under the IDEIA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (2012).
Due process proceedings are heard by administrative law judges, and they have many special
safeguards that distinguish them from general federal litigation. See Andrew M.I. Lee, What
to Expect at a Due Process Hearing, UNDERSTOOD, https://www.understood.org/en/school-
learning/your-childs-rights/dispute-resolution/what-to-expect-at-a-due-process-hearing
[https://perma.cc/RG96-5MQ8]. A litigant can appeal a due process decision to the U.S.
District Courts. See id.
88. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 185.
89. Id. at 185-86.
90. Id. at 185 (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 185-86.
92. See id.
93. Id. at 186.
94. See id. at 209-10.
95. See id. at 198-99.
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requirements, a school must ensure that a disabled student’s IEP is
“reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational
benefits.”96 More specifically, the Court held that as a general rule,
academically successful disabled students—that is, disabled stu-
dents in general education courses who passed from grade-to-
grade—could largely be monitored by “the system itself.”97 In other
words, the Court suggested that when a disabled student was able
to pass his courses in a general education environment that he
almost certainly was not denied a FAPE, regardless of the disparity
between his potential and his actual performance.98
2. Standard Adopted in Endrew
After the Court’s Rowley decision, a circuit split emerged
regarding the amount of “educational benefit[ ]” the FAPE standard
required.99 The majority of circuits held that disabled students
needed to have only “some educational benefit” in order to receive a
FAPE.100 A minority of the circuits, on the other hand, used a
“heightened ‘meaningful educational benefit standard.’”101 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to Endrew in order to resolve this
split and to determine what level of educational benefit was
required for a school to satisfy its FAPE requirements.102
Endrew F., a fifth-grade student with autism, attended public
school from preschool through fourth grade.103 Unlike Amy Rowley,
96. Id. at 207; Martin W. Bates, Note, Free Appropriate Public Education Under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Requirements, Issues and Suggestions, 1994 BYU
EDUC. & L.J. 215, 216. The Court also used the phrase “some educational benefit[s].” Rowley,
458 U.S. at 200. Several lower courts latched on to that language; however, the Supreme
Court later clarified that “some” was not the correct standard. See Holly T. Howell, Note, Neil
Gorsuch, a Unanimous SCOTUS, and a Circuit Split Resolved: What Is the Big “IDEA”?, 40
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 603, 607-09 (2017).
97. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202-03, 210.
98. See id.
99. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9-15, Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1,
137 S. Ct. 988 (2017) (No. 15-827); Holly T. Howell, Comment, Endrew F. v. Douglas County
School District: How Much Benefit Is Enough When Evaluating the Educational Needs of
Disabled Students in Federally-Funded Public Schools?, 40 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 347, 376-92
(2016).
100. Howell, supra note 96, at 607-09.
101. See id. (quoting Howell, supra note 99, at 377).
102. See Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 993 (2017).
103. Id. at 996.
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however, Endrew was not a strong student and, according to his
parents, he had stopped growing academically and functionally.104
His IEPs corroborated his parents’ concerns, since his annual IEP
goals were stagnant and reflected little to no academic advance-
ment.105
After receiving a similar IEP for Endrew’s fifth grade year,
Endrew’s parents decided to unilaterally remove him from public
school and place him in a private day school for students with
disabilities.106 Endrew’s parents then began due process proceed-
ings, arguing that they were entitled to reimbursement for private
school costs since their son had been denied a FAPE.107 A state
administrative law judge held that Endrew had not been denied a
FAPE.108 This decision was affirmed by the United States District
Court for the District of Colorado and eventually by the Tenth
Circuit.109
The Tenth Circuit specifically noted that Endrew received a
FAPE since he had demonstrated at least “some progress.”110 The
court, using Rowley to justify its decision, held that so long as a
disabled student’s IEP was written to create more than a de
minimis educational benefit, the IEP was adequate.111
The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit, holding that the
“merely more than de minimis” standard failed to ensure that
students received a FAPE.112 The Court proposed a new standard
drawn heavily from Rowley: “To meet its substantive obligation
under the [IDEIA], a school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated
to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s
circumstances.”113 Given the highly personalized nature of IEPs, the
104. Id. In a recent report, the U.S. Department of Education analyzed Endrew’s scope,
stating that the Endrew standard “applies ... to any [IDEIA]-eligible child with a disability
... regardless of the child’s disability, the age of the child, or the child’s current placement.”
See Q&A, supra note 27, at 5. Endrew has been applied in cases involving twice-exceptional
students. See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
105. See Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 996.
106. See id.





112. Id. at 1001-02.
113. Id. at 999.
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Court explained that it could not define what “‘appropriate’ prog-
ress” looked like in each case.114 The Court did, however, provide
several general suggestions.115 Throughout its ruling, the Court
suggested that, as in Rowley, grade-to-grade advancement of dis-
abled students in mainstream classrooms may be enough; however,
the Court also noted that disabled students “should have the chance
to meet challenging objectives.”116
D. An Overview of Gifted Education
Unlike special education for disabled students, which has re-
ceived much federal attention, gifted education is largely within the
exclusive purview of state law.117 This Section describes the limited
federal policy in addition to providing an overview of state gifted
education law.
1. Federal Gifted Education
Federal legislation, such as the IDEIA, has helped ensure that
disabled students receive at least some protection.118 Unlike
disabled students, gifted students have not received such federal
attention.119 And, though there have been some attempts to estab-
lish federal gifted programs, these programs (at least at the federal
level) have waned in and out of favor over time.
Gifted education was a high priority in the late 1950s.120 As part
of the National Defense Education Act of 1958, Congress allocated
federal funding to the states in an effort to provide gifted education
programming.121 In the 1960s, interest in gifted education waned;
however, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 did
114. Id. at 1001.
115. See id. at 999-1001.
116. Id.
117. See Monica Miller, Taking a New Look at Gifted Education: A Response to a Changing
World, 4 APPALACHIAN J.L. 89, 107 (2005).
118. See supra Part I.B.2.
119. See Miller, supra note 117, at 95-98; Patrick Haney, Comment, The Gifted
Commitment: Gifted Education’s Unrecognized Relevance in “Thorough and Efficient” Public
Schools, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 279, 280-82 (2013).
120. See Haney, supra note 119, at 281.
121. See Millman, supra note 30, at 468-69.
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provide some funding for gifted students.122 In 1969, Congress re-
newed its interest in gifted education and passed The Gifted and
Talented Children’s Education Assistance Act of 1969.123 This Act,
like its predecessor, provided federal funding for gifted program-
ming.124 Interest in gifted education continued to rise during the
early 1970s.125 One of the most significant legislative victories for
gifted education occurred as part of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1974.126 This Act created the Office of the Gifted
and Talented and authorized appropriations for gifted and talented
education.127 These advances were further supplemented by the
1978 Gifted and Talented Children’s Education Act.128 Unfortu-
nately for advocates of gifted and talented education, much of the
advances of the 1970s were lost as a result of the 1981 Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act, which repealed the 1978 Gifted and
Talented Children’s Education Act and closed the Office of the
Gifted and Talented.129
Currently, the Jacob K. Javits Gifted and Talented Students
Education Act (Javits Act) governs federal gifted and talented
education.130 Unlike the IDEIA, which provides substantive and
procedural safeguards for disabled students,131 the Javits Act is a
funding program that supports programs, projects, and research
that help schools better identify and serve gifted and talented
students.132 In other words, though the Javits Act supports educa-
tional programming for gifted and talented students, it neither
provides nationwide standards nor implements safeguards for
students whose needs are not met.133
122. See id. at 469.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 469-70.
126. See id.
127. See Haney, supra note 119, at 282.
128. See Millman, supra note 30, at 471.
129. See id.
130. See 20 U.S.C. § 7294 (2012); Millman, supra note 30, at 471-73.
131. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
132. See 20 U.S.C. § 7294(a).
133. Additionally, programs under the Javits Act, unlike the IDEIA, receive limited
funding. Between 2010 and 2016, Javits Act funding peaked at approximately twelve million
dollars. Jacob K. Javits Gifted and Talented Students Education Program: Funding Status,
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www2.ed.gov/programs/javits/funding.html [https://
2020] ENDREW ’S IMPACT ON TWICE-EXCEPTIONAL STUDENTS 863
2. State Gifted Education
Since the federal government does not require that the states
have gifted programs or policies in place, the overall scope of gifted
education varies widely at the state level.134 Given the relative
dearth of gifted programming at the federal level, one might assume
that the states would have relatively comprehensive gifted educa-
tion programming to fill in the gap. Such an assumption, however,
is largely inaccurate. A substantial number of states have no
mandatory gifted education policy and, furthermore, those states
that have policies in place often provide only limited funding to
support gifted programs.135 This diversity in programming has led
to wide “disparities in services” across the states, leading to crit-
icism from some education advocacy groups.136 Of the states that
mandate gifted education, a range of programs and policies have
been instituted, including: (1) Gifted Individualized Education
Programs (GIEPs), (2) special classes for gifted students, and (3)
perma.cc/YKD3-XD25]. Comparatively, the states received over thirteen billion dollars in
IDEIA funding in 2017. IDEA PRIMER, supra note 47, at 2.
134. See Miller, supra note 117, at 92-94; Gifted by State, NAT’L ASS’N FOR GIFTED
CHILDREN, https://www.nagc.org/information-publications/gifted-state [https://perma.cc/KQ
6V-K2AT].
135. See Support for Gifted Programs Vary Greatly from State to State, DAVIDSON INST.,
https://www.davidsongifted.org/Search-Database/entryType/3 [https://perma.cc/K97H-8NXK]
[hereinafter Support for Gifted Programs]. A recent report of thirty-nine states’ gifted
education funding found that twelve states provided no funds for gifted education. NAT’L ASS’N
FOR GIFTED CHILDREN & COUNCIL OF STATE DIRS. OF PROGRAMS FOR THE GIFTED, 2014-2015
STATE OF THE STATES IN GIFTED EDUCATION 7 (2015), http://www.nagc.org/sites/default/
files/key%20reports/2014-2015%20State%20of%20the%20States%20summary.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LHN4-YYQE]. Of those states that did fund gifted education, the amount
ranged from approximately $150,000 to $157.2 million. See id. Even assuming consistent
funding, however, state gifted programs would still differ given that state-based definitions
of giftedness vary. States that focus exclusively on “academically gifted” students, for
instance, capture a different student population than those that recognize “creative[ ]
giftedness,” for instance. See id. at 13-14.
136. Haney, supra note 119, at 287. The lack of comprehensive state support for gifted
programming likely stems, at least partly, from funding concerns. Compared to other
students, gifted students’ needs appear less critical. This perception, however, is largely
inaccurate. Studies suggest that “gifted students do not make it on their own [and] ...
underachiev[e] relative to their potential.” Elizabeth A. Siemer, Bored Out of Their Minds:
The Detrimental Effects of No Child Left Behind on Gifted Children, 30 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
539, 545-46 (2009). This, in turn, contributes to many issues, notably high drop-out rates and
depression. See id. at 546.
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acceleration programs.137 In addition to focusing on specific student
programming, states have also created a variety of procedural
requirements.138 Some states, for instance, have parental notifi-
cation requirements, teacher training requirements, or provisions
that require the hiring of a gifted education administrator.139
II. THE PROBLEM: DID ENDREW MODIFY THE FAPE STANDARD FOR
TWICE-EXCEPTIONAL STUDENTS?
After the Supreme Court decided Endrew, many advocates sug-
gested that the decision would have a significant impact on Amer-
ica’s disabled student population since the new standard would
“dramatically expand[ ]” the FAPE requirement.140 While it is true
that Endrew could have a notable impact on many of America’s
disabled students, the fact remains that Endrew’s FAPE standard
will have a more modest effect on twice-exceptional students.141 This
Part begins by summarizing advocates’ main arguments regarding
Endrew’s impact on disabled students and twice-exceptional
students. The remainder of this Part will discuss why these views,
especially those attributed to twice-exceptional students, are over-
stated.
A. Advocates’ Reading of Endrew
Endrew, on the whole, failed to add meaningful protections for
twice-exceptional students. Nevertheless, some advocates (namely
parent groups and disability rights organizations) have begun to
137. Jamie M. Kautz, Note, No “Gift” Giving Here: The Inadequate Gifted Education
Programs in New York State and the Need for Gifted Education Reform, 25 J.L. & POL’Y 687,
699-706 (2017).
138. See Support for Gifted Programs, supra note 135.
139. See id.
140. See, e.g., Conn, supra note 81, at 612 (outlining typical reactions to Endrew); Laura
McKenna, How a New Supreme Court Ruling Could Affect Special Education, ATLANTIC (Mar.
23, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/03/ how-a-new-supreme-court-
ruling-could-affect-special-education/520662/ [https://perma.cc/YPE5-5HU3] (outlining advo-
cates’ views on Endrew); see also Chin-Wen Lee & Jennifer A. Ritchotte, Seeing and
Supporting Twice-Exceptional Learners, 82 EDUC. F. 68, 73-74 (2018) (“[Endrew] holds merits
for providing educational services to twice-exceptional students [because schools must now]
afford them the opportunity to achieve to their full potential in school.” (emphasis added)).
141. See infra Part II.B.
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suggest otherwise.142 Since advocates’ opinions provide a useful
starting point for considering the Endrew standard, this Section will
consider some of the most common arguments and readings advo-
cates have made post-Endrew. Importantly, advocates’ readings are
often supported by the text of Endrew (and may even be accurate
when considering traditionally disabled students).143 However, the
opinions are often steeped in a narrow comparison of the new and
old FAPE standards and tend to highlight specific, isolated language
from Endrew without considering the decision as a whole.144
Advocates accurately cite Endrew’s central holding that “a school
district must offer an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to
make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”145
And, advocates reasonably suggest that this holding heightened the
“appropriate” prong of the FAPE standard since the Court in
Endrew—unlike that in Rowley—established that “some” or “de
minimis” progress is insufficient.146 To advocates, this (at a mini-
mum) removed lower court reliance on Rowley’s “some educational
benefit” language, meaning that trivial academic progression will no
longer satisfy a school’s FAPE requirement.147 This interpretation
of the law, especially when considering nongifted, disabled stu-
dents, is largely correct. Issues arise, however, when advocates
attempt to use this framework to assess the impact on twice-
exceptional students.148 Since twice-exceptional students have the
ability to progress through the curriculum at grade-level (or above
grade-level) rates,149 the move from Rowley to Endrew largely fails
142. See Advocating for Your Child Using Endrew F., PARTNERS RES. NETWORK (Oct. 19,
2018), http://prntexas.org/advocating-for-your-child-using-endrew-f/ [https://perma.cc/P32C-
Q6MC]; J. Mark Bade, Advocating for Twice-Exceptional Children, 2E NEWSL. (2018), http://
www.nagc.org/sites/default/files/Advocacy/Advocating%20for%202e.pdf [https://perma.cc/
J3XF-HYLK]; supra note 141 and accompanying text.
143. See supra Part I.C.2.
144. See, e.g., Advocating for Your Child Using Endrew F., supra note 142 (citing “chal-
lenging objectives” language as evidence that the standard changed for twice-exceptional
students).
145. Adam Dayan, SCOTUS Decides Endrew F. Case and Establishes New Legal Standard,
LAW OFFS. OF ADAM DAYAN (Mar. 29, 2017, 3:12 PM) (emphasis omitted), http://blog.dayanlaw
firm.com/2017/03/scotus-decides-endrew-f-case-and.html [https://perma.cc/58J3-J5VG].
146. See supra notes 112, 141-44 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 100, 141-44 and accompanying text.
148. See infra Part II.B.
149. See Millman, supra note 30, at 479.
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to affect twice-exceptional students, at least to the degree advocates
would suggest. 
A potential advocate’s reading of the Endrew holding can be best
understood by considering a hypothetical: Suppose that a twice-
exceptional student with dyslexia has historically received high
scores in mainstream math courses. In his current math course,
however, the student struggles due to the high number of word
problems used. Thanks to the student’s high cognitive ability, the
student is able to pass, albeit with a “D” average. Reviewing the
aforementioned FAPE standard alone, an advocate may suggest
that Endrew requires the school to provide the student with extra
services or accommodations despite his passing grade. After all,
when viewing the student’s historical data, one could surmise that
his low (but passing) score is not “appropriate” given his former
success in mathematics. Moreover, one could argue that the student
is only exhibiting trivial progress and, theoretically, may be re-
gressing.
This particular reading of the Endrew FAPE standard is fur-
ther bolstered by specific, isolated language from Endrew, which—
at first glance—appears to raise the FAPE standard for twice-
exceptional students like the student in the hypothetical.150 First,
Endrew, more so than Rowley, highlights the importance of actual,
observable progress, noting that an IEP’s purpose is to enable a
disabled student to progress academically and/or functionally.151 In
this vein, advocates often cite Endrew’s call for a “markedly more
demanding” standard.152 These advocates then juxtapose this with
some lower courts’ interpretations of Rowley, including the Tenth
Circuit’s de minimis standard, which, in effect, allowed for negligi-
ble student progress.153
150. See Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 1000-01 (2017).
151. See id. at 999 (“The IEP must aim to enable the child to make progress. After all, the
essential function of an IEP is to set out a plan for pursuing academic and functional
advancement.”). Though Rowley is not inconsistent with this sentiment, the Rowley Court did
not emphasize this.
152. See Courtney Hansen, Endrew F. in Action, INCLUSION EVOLUTION (March 19, 2018),
https://www.inclusionevolution.com/endrew-f-in-action/ [https://perma.cc/LJ6D-MJFD];
Landmark Supreme Court Decision Raises the Bar, MATRIX PARENT NETWORK & RES. CTR.,
http://www.matrixparents.org/community-news-and-events/whats-happening/landmark-
supreme-court-decision-raises-bar/ [https://perma.cc/D5XD-7N9R].
153. See, e.g., Dayan, supra note 145; Landmark Supreme Court Decision Raises the Bar,
supra note 152.
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Second, advocates focus on particular passages in Endrew. These
passages, advocates suggest, give bite to the individualized nature
of FAPE, stating not only that students should make “appropri-
ate[ ]” progress based on their unique traits and circumstances, but
also that students should be given “the chance to meet challenging
objectives.”154 As advocates suggest, this language in Endrew, at
least when considered in isolation, could make a difference for twice-
exceptional students.155 In the hypothetical, for instance, an advo-
cate could argue that the student’s passing grade is not enough to
dismiss his FAPE claim since a court would need to consider
whether the material appropriately “challeng[ed]” the twice-
exceptional student.156 Assuming the student’s issues are with the
reading of word problems rather than the math itself, this language
from Endrew could theoretically support a holding that the hypo-
thetical student be placed in an accelerated program. Similarly,
language from Endrew could support a twice-exceptional student’s
participation in a dual enrichment/specialized instruction program,
especially if the student’s reading deficit was causing limited prog-
ress or a regression in his math skills.157
Finally, when viewed in isolation, the language in Endrew could
support advocates’ position since the language appears to raise
Rowley’s “floor of opportunity,”158 and thereby increase the level of
progress required. The “floor of opportunity” language in Rowley
suggested that very little was required of the states—namely, that
disabled students had “access” to the physical school building.159
Endrew hints that the Rowley fact situation and the governing law
at the time, the EAHCA, rendered a focus on actual academic bene-
fit unnecessary.160 And, though Endrew fails to comprehensively
describe the shift from the EAHCA to the modern IDEIA, scholars
have recognized that the various amendments and reauthorizations
154. See, e.g., Advocating for Your Child Using Endrew F., supra note 142 (quoting Endrew
F., 137 S. Ct. at 1000).
155. See id.; see also Dayan, supra note 145.
156. Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1000.
157. See Lee & Ritchotte, supra note 140, at 73-74; Advocating for Your Child Using
Endrew F., supra note 142; Dayan, supra note 145.
158. See Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 201
(1982).
159. See id. at 200-02.
160. Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999-1000 (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202).
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of the IDEIA may raise the FAPE standard. This is because the
IDEIA (as opposed to the EAHCA) focuses on disabled students’
access to the general educational curriculum as opposed to their
ability to access physical school buildings.161
Taken together, advocates’ reading of Endrew is a potential
windfall for the twice-exceptional student. Under such a constricted
reading, students must progress at a pace that far exceeds the de
minimis standard and other “some” progress standards. Considering
the historic academic gains of twice-exceptional students, this new
standard may require more than mere grade-to-grade progress.
Though such a reading is theoretically possible, a holistic under-
standing of the opinion suggests that it is not what the Court
intended.
B. A Holistic Reading of Endrew
Twice-exceptional students are unlikely to experience significant
change as a result of the Supreme Court’s Endrew opinion. This
claim is supported by three points: (1) the heightened language in
Endrew is directed at students who are not progressing in a general
education environment, (2) the Endrew opinion reaffirms Rowley’s
assumptions and central holding, and (3) the purpose of the IDEIA
and other fairness concerns will prevent heightened Endrew lan-
guage from dramatically increasing the FAPE standard for twice-
exceptional students.
1. The Heightened Language in Endrew Is Directed at 
Students Not Progressing in a Mainstream Environment
The heightened language scattered throughout Endrew (for
example, “challenging objectives,” “markedly more demanding,” and
“ambitious in light of [the child’s] circumstances”) is not presented
in isolation.162 Take the “challenging objectives” language, for in-
161. Compare O.S. v. Fairfax Cty. Sch. Bd., 804 F.3d 354, 358-59 (4th Cir. 2015)
(suggesting that IDEIA amendments did not raise the FAPE standard), with Scott F. Johnson,
Reexamining Rowley: A New Focus in Special Education Law, 2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 561,
578-80 (suggesting that IDEIA amendments did raise the FAPE standard).
162. Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1000.
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stance.163 On its own, a student’s right “to meet challenging objec-
tives” appears to raise the FAPE standard for twice-exceptional
students.164 Such language could mean that a twice-exceptional
student is placed in gifted courses with supports, or perhaps, that
a student’s IEP goals are written to require a higher level of
accuracy and precision, not just a passable understanding of a
concept.165 The issue with such a reading is that the “challenging
objectives” language, when read in its full context, retains the
restrictive mainstreaming and grade-to-grade advancement lan-
guage from Rowley.166 This section of the Endrew opinion, in full,
reads: “[The student’s] educational program must be appropriately
ambitious in light of his circumstances, just as advancement from
grade to grade is appropriately ambitious for most children in the
regular classroom. The goals may differ, but every child should have
the chance to meet challenging objectives.”167 Here, the Court jux-
taposes grade-to-grade advancement as the standard on the high
end of the spectrum with “challenging objectives” as a lower
alternative.168 Thus, read in its broader context, it appears that the
Court intended this language to affect disabled students outside of
the general education curriculum (that is, nonmainstreamed
students) who, additionally were unable to meet grade-level
standards. In other words, if a student in a self-contained, special
education environment is not able to make yearly grade-level
growth, the Court will accept his limited progress so long as the stu-
dent was offered “the chance to meet challenging objectives.”169
The “challenging objectives” language loses even more of its force
when considering twice-exceptional students’ placement. Twice-
exceptional students, compared to their nongifted, disabled peers,
are more likely to be mainstreamed.170 As previously mentioned,
IDEIA provisions mandate that a student be placed in the least








170. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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giftedness (or, at the very least, their general ability to develop
coping mechanisms), many will participate in mainstream courses—
meaning that grade-to-grade level advancement will be the basic
test to determine whether a student received a FAPE.172
Yet, even for those nonmainstreamed, twice-exceptional students
(or those twice-exceptional students who are not progressing grade-
to-grade each year in all courses), this “challenging objective”
language may still fail to provide much benefit since some lower
courts have occasionally utilized a “holistic” approach when review-
ing a student’s progress.173 The holistic approach considers a
disabled student’s “overall academic record,” not the student’s
individual deficiencies, when determining if a FAPE violation has
occurred.174 Under this approach, a student’s deficiencies may be
disregarded if he has made “appropriate” progress in his other
courses,175 meaning that a student need not even pass all courses to
be considered advancing from grade-to-grade. This is problematic
for twice-exceptional students, many of whom excel in certain
academic areas but need intense support in others.176
Thus, while Endrew’s heightened language scattered throughout
the opinion is certainly helpful for low-performing students and
those in wholly special education courses, it is unlikely that this
language will help twice-exceptional students’ arguments that they
have been denied a FAPE, since the language seems specifically
written to deal with students on the lower end of the spectrum.
2. Endrew Reaffirms Rowley’s Assumptions and Central
Holding
Importantly, Endrew declined to overturn Rowley.177 Instead, the
Court minimized Rowley’s applicability when handling “close[ ]
cases”—such as Endrew—while reaffirming some of Rowley’s major
tenets,178 notably: (1) the educational system’s ability to effectively
172. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
173. See Klein Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Hovem, 690 F.3d 390, 391, 396-400 (5th Cir. 2012);
Renee J. v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 333 F. Supp. 3d 674, 683-84, 688, 691-92 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
174. Hovem, 690 F.3d at 397, 399-400.
175. See supra Part I.A.
176. See supra Part I.A.
177. See Colker, supra note 83, at 443.
178. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 998 (2017).
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monitor students in mainstream courses,179 (2) the appropriateness
of grade-to-grade advancement,180 and (3) the belief that lower-
functioning disabled students should receive more protections and
services than higher-functioning disabled students.181 Given this,
Rowley’s general standard still stands, albeit with the caveat that
if grade-to-grade advancement in mainstream courses is not made
that the student’s progress should at least be “appropriate in light
of [his] circumstances.”182
Yet, despite Endrew’s general endorsement of Rowley, some
commentators and advocates have noted that dicta from Endrew
could limit Rowley’s applicability.183 Unlike the Rowley decision,
which clearly emphasized that mainstream grade-to-grade progress
generally meant that a student received a FAPE,184 Endrew
seemingly placed less weight on this contention, even going so far as
to state that grade-to-grade progress “should not be interpreted as
an inflexible rule” and, moreover, that just because a disabled child
progresses grade-to-grade does not mean that he automatically
receives a FAPE.185 Theoretically, commentators suggest, this lan-
guage could be used to twice-exceptional students’ advantage since
twice-exceptional students are the very students who could advance
grade-to-grade without achieving “appropriately ambitious” goals.186
Nevertheless, this language is unlikely to raise the FAPE
standard for twice-exceptional students since this dicta does not
distinguish Endrew from Rowley.187 Though rarely cited by commen-
tators interpreting Endrew, Rowley contains a footnote with similar
language: “We do not hold today that every handicapped child who
is advancing from grade to grade ... is automatically receiving a
179. See id. at 999.
180. See id. at 999-1000.
181. See id. at 996, 1000.
182. Id. at 998-99.
183. See Dayan, supra note 145; Brian T. Pearce, The Endrew Decision: A Better
Educational Standard for Special Needs Students, NEXSEN PRUET (Mar. 23, 2017), https://
www.nexsenpruet.com/insights/the-endrew-decision-a-better-educational-standard-for-special-
needs-students [https://perma.cc/YUN2-2RJM].
184. See Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 204,
209-10 (1982).
185. Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1000 n.2.
186. Id. at 1000; see supra note 185 and accompanying text.
187. Compare Endrew, 137 S. Ct. at 1000 n.2, with Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203 n.25.
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[FAPE].”188 Thus, even though the Endrew dicta, on its face, seems
promising, it will not actually change how the lower courts interpret
Endrew since similar language has existed for over thirty years.189
It is possible, however, that the language was meant to apply to
twice-exceptional students who, like the student in the earlier
hypothetical,190 progress at a grade-to-grade level, but even with
advancement may be regressing over time. Such an issue has not
yet been discussed at length by the courts, possibly because proving
regression could be difficult. However, even if regression was
proven, such an interpretation still seems unlikely.191 Rowley, lower
court cases, and Endrew all adopt the logic that systematic advance-
ment is all that is really promised to any student—disabled or
not.192 Thus, as will be discussed below, it seems unlikely that the
Court would promise twice-exceptional students more protections
(or better educational outcomes) than their nondisabled peers by
holding that a certain level of proficiency is required for the FAPE
standard to be met.193 More likely, the Court’s dicta was included as
a placeholder to prevent bad behavior from school districts.194 For
188. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203 n.25.
189. The rejection of the “automatic” rule did little for twice-exceptional students in the
thirty years post-Rowley. See, e.g., N.P. v. Maxwell, No. 16-1164, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS
24803, at *1-5 (4th Cir. Dec. 8, 2017) (failing to use dicta for twice-exceptional student who
apparently was progressing grade-to-grade); Klein Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Hovem, 690 F.3d 390
(5th Cir. 2012) (failing to use dicta for twice-exceptional student who was advancing grade-to-
grade, but lacked basic skills). The post-Rowley cases generally drew a hard line between
successful, cognitively advanced students such as Amy Rowley and struggling students with
lower cognition such as Endrew F. Compare Hovem, 690 F.3d at 398-400, with J.M. v. Morris
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 10-cv-06660, 2011 WL 6779546, at *15 (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2011).
Given the Endrew Court’s explicit discussion of these students’ differences, it appears that
the Endrew decision will not support a different understanding. See Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at
996, 999-1000.
190. See supra Part II.A.
191. Generally, under Rowley, some level of regression or failure has been acceptable. See
supra note 191 and accompanying text. Under Endrew, there is some minor indication that
regression is not acceptable; however, individuals primarily bring this claim at the admini-
strative law judge level. See Student v. Prince George’s Cty. Pub. Sch., OAH No. MSDE-
PGEO-OT-18-01010, at 47 (Md. Office of Admin. Hearings May 3, 2018), https://decisions-oah.
maryland.gov/Hearing%20Documents/172532_Redacted.pdf [https://perma.cc/23AQ-RCMS].
Also, these discussions fail to mention Endrew’s dicta. See id. at 47.
192. See Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999; Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203.
193. See infra Part II.B.3.
194. See J.M., 2011 WL 6779546, at *11-15.
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instance, this language could likely be used if a school district arti-
ficially raised a child’s grades to ensure that he passed.195
Of course, it should be noted that some post-Endrew, twice-
exceptional student decisions have slightly softened on the grade-to-
grade language previously discussed.196 However, a review of these
decisions, at least as of early 2019, suggests that the reduced reli-
ance on grade-to-grade language only occurs when a twice-excep-
tional student’s abilities are so out of balance with his progress that
the student’s IEP objectives must have been patently unsuitable
from the beginning.197 For instance, in Student v. Prince George’s
County Public Schools, a state administrative law judge held that
a twice-exceptional student was denied a FAPE because the school
did not consider the student’s advanced cognitive abilities.198 This
student had an IQ of 121 (superior range) and was identified as
having “superior verbal comprehension, superior perceptual reason-
ing or nonverbal reasoning and gifted verbal abstract thinking.”199
Despite the student’s clear cognitive abilities and some supports in
the classroom, however, the student was approximately one year
behind in his reading abilities.200 The state administrative law judge
suggested, in line with advocates’ opinions, that the student’s
giftedness needed to be taken into consideration and further that he
should have been advancing at a quicker rate.201 However, it should
be noted that this situation was unique in that (1) the school
provided no reading goals despite the student’s obvious needs and
(2) the school did not ever consider the student’s unique status as
twice-exceptional (demonstrated by the school’s placement of the
student in the lowest-level reading class and his teachers’ commen-
tary that they had low expectations of the student’s abilities).202 Had
the school done the bare minimum (e.g., created an IEP that ad-
dressed all needs and trained teachers on twice-exceptionality) it is
195. See Pearce, supra note 183 (“[T]his footnote serves to protect children from a system
that will advance children to a higher grade simply to meet IDEA.”).
196. Prince George’s Cty. Pub. Sch., OAH No. MSDE-PGEO-OT-18-01010, at 32.
197. See id. at 32-40 (“[The school failed to] acknowledge[ ] ... [a s]tudent’s individual
circumstance of being twice exceptional.”).
198. See id. at 38.
199. Id. at 11.
200. See id. at 38.
201. See id. at 51-52.
202. See id. at 38-39, 41, 44.
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likely that the administrative law judge would not have reached the
same conclusion.203 After all, in several similar cases post-Endrew,
the courts have ruled that twice-exceptional students behind grade-
level are receiving a FAPE when some minimum action is taken.204
Thus, there may be some slight shift post-Endrew when consider-
ing cases such as Student v. Prince George’s County Public Schools.
Such a shift, however, appears to mainly occur when a school fails
to consider a student as an individual.205 Otherwise, the lower
courts’ post-Endrew cases do not substantially differ from those
decided post-Rowley.206 As noted, however, this is not completely
surprising given the Court’s general adoption of Rowley’s major
tenets.
3. The IDEIA’s Purpose and Other Fairness Concerns Will
Prevent Heightened Endrew Language from Increasing the
FAPE Standard
Endrew, like Rowley, wholly rejects the “equal opportunity”
argument raised by student petitioners, claiming that the IDEIA
does not demand equality between disabled students and their non-
disabled peers.207 Since the Court rejected an equality standard, it
can also be assumed that the Court would similarly reject any
standard that requires that disabled students receive more than
their nondisabled peers.
Endrew’s FAPE standard clearly addresses and protects disabled
students in self-contained environments and students who are not
advancing grade-to-grade.208 Specifically, Endrew suggests that
these students should receive extra support until they are progress-
203. See id.
204. See, e.g., N.P. v. Maxwell, No. 16-1164, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 24803, at *7 (4th Cir.
Dec. 8, 2017); Student v. Montgomery Cty. Pub. Sch., OAH No. MSDE-MONT-OT-17-05289,
at 45-48, 85-87, 90 (Md. Office of Admin. Hearings July 12, 2017), http://maryland
publicschools.org/programs/Documents/Special-Ed/FSDR/HearingDecisions/2018/1/17-H-
MONT-05289.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 5TVU-SV5R].
205. See supra notes 200-203 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
207. See Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 995 (2017); Bd. of Educ.
of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 198-99 (1982).
208. See Endrew, 137 S. Ct. at 1000-01 (“It cannot be the case that the Act typically aims
for grade-level advancement for children with disabilities who can be educated in the regular
classroom, but is satisfied with barely more than de minimis progress for those who cannot.”).
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ing at individually appropriate levels.209 Thus, Endrew allows dis-
abled students to receive services that help them reach the progress
that nondisabled students make (namely, grade-to-grade advance-
ment).210 But, the Court is also clear that schools are not required
to help disabled students progress at rates exceeding those to which
a nondisabled student is entitled.211 Therefore, given that twice-
exceptional students largely participate in the general educational
curriculum, it is highly unlikely that Endrew would ever mandate
services that help a student meet “challenging objectives” or make
“appropriate” progress if these objectives or progress required more
than grade-to-grade advancement.212 In other words, a twice-
exceptional student (like a nondisabled student) will be confined to
services and supports that get him to progress at a grade level
rate.213 Once the twice-exceptional student progresses at a more
advanced rate, however, a school will likely not provide services—
even if this means that the student is trivially progressing or
experiencing regression in some skills.214
Such a conclusion is perhaps unsurprising. After all, the IDEIA
does not include “giftedness” as a category for eligibility, and thus,
it should come as no surprise that giftedness will not be sup-
ported.215 Moreover, even if a particular judge believed that a
student deserved more than grade-to-grade advancement, his
decision would likely be overturned on the longstanding premise
highlighted in both Endrew and Rowley that judges cannot substi-
tute their own beliefs when considering school policy.216
209. See id. at 999-1001.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 995-96, 999-1001.
212. See id. at 1000-01.
213. See id.
214. See supra note 206 and accompanying text. Though decided before Endrew, the
Downington case suggests that issues of giftedness, enrichment, and acceleration will not be
decided under the IDEIA. Downington Area Sch. Dist. v. K.D., No. 1485 C.D. 2016, 2017 WL
877316, at *1, *4 n.7 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Mar. 6, 2017).
215. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (2012).
216. See Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001; Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch.
Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982).
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III. A POTENTIAL SOLUTION: FOCUSING ON TWICE-EXCEPTIONAL
STUDENTS’ GIFTS
Endrew’s substantive FAPE standard largely failed to produce
meaningful change for the twice-exceptional student population.217
Grade-to-grade progress is still generally considered sufficient, and,
given the language in Endrew, it appears that a twice-exceptional
student could experience inconsistent progress—or even some
regression—while still receiving a FAPE.218
Given this reality, what can be done to ensure that twice-
exceptional students are actually progressing at individually ap-
propriate levels? Furthermore, how can school districts and state
legislatures ensure that twice-exceptional students’ academic
deficiencies are actually addressed? There is no perfect solution,
especially given the variation between individual twice-exceptional
students.219 Nevertheless, a state statutory creation—Gifted
Individualized Education Plans (GIEPs)—could offer additional
protections for twice-exceptional students and ensure that these
students,220 like their traditionally disabled counterparts, progress
at levels “appropriate in light of [their] circumstances.”221 And, since
GIEPs are state creations, they are not tied to the IDEIA and,
therefore, can function independently from Endrew and Rowley’s
substantive FAPE standard.222
A. What Is a GIEP?
A GIEP is a document that is similar in form and substance to an
IEP.223 A notable distinction, of course, is that a GIEP provides
specialized education to assist giftedness whereas an IEP provides
specialized education to assist a disability.224 This means that unlike
an IEP, which will regularly include services and accommodations
217. See supra Part II.
218. See supra Part II.B.
219. See TWICE-EXCEPTIONAL DILEMMA, supra note 3, at 5.
220. See infra Part III.A.
221. See Endrew, 137 S. Ct. at 999.
222. See infra Part III.A.
223. See Kautz, supra note 137, at 701.
224. See id. at 701.
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to support deficiencies (for example, shorter assignments, a one-on-
one aide, or speech services),225 a GIEP will include enrichment-
based services and accommodations (for example, accelerated
courses, cluster grouping with gifted peers, or online education).226
Like an IEP, a GIEP is an annual document that, under most
frameworks, contains (1) a statement describing the student’s cur-
rent performance; (2) a list of tailored, measurable academic goals;
and (3) a list of accommodations and services that the school district
will provide in order to help the student progress in the classroom
and meet his annual goals.227 Depending on the state statute, the
GIEP may share other similarities with the IEP.228 For instance, a
GIEP statute can be written to provide a student and his parents
with certain legal protections, safeguards, and causes of action when
the GIEP is not implemented correctly or when the student fails to
receive an appropriate education.229
Of course, GIEPs, unlike IEPs, are not mandated by the IDEIA
or any other federal law.230 Rather, GIEPs are created via state
statute or regulation.231 Currently, only a handful of states offer
GIEPs.232 Importantly, this means that the actual implementation
and effectiveness of GIEPs will be based on the state’s statutory
language and state court interpretation of such language.233 Yet, de-
spite some minor state-by-state variation, states that utilize GIEPs
have a consistent goal: to provide gifted students a tailored, indi-
vidualized, and appropriate education.234
225. See Supports, Modifications, and Accommodations for Students, CTR. FOR PARENT
INFO. & RES. (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.parentcenterhub.org/accommodations/ [https://perma.
cc/TB49-Z3ZR].
226. See TWICE EXCEPTIONAL GUIDEBOOK, supra note 1, at C-2; Gifted Education
Guidelines, PA. DEP’T EDUC. (May 2014), https://www.education.pa.gov/Documents/K-12/
Gifted%20Education/Gifted%20Program%20Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TSH-FPBD].
227. See Kautz, supra note 137, at 701, 703-04.
228. Compare 22 PA. CODE § 16.32 (2019) (describing required GIEP team members), with
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B) (2012) (describing required IEP team members).
229. See 22 PA. CODE § 16.61-65; see also Kautz, supra note 137, at 717-18.
230. See Kautz, supra note 137, at 699.
231. See id.
232. See Carolyn K., Gifted Education Mandates, by State or Province, HOAGIES’ GIFTED
EDUC. PAGE (June 1, 2019), http://www.hoagiesgifted.org/mandates.htm [https://perma.cc/
5ZYZ-MYBJ] [hereinafter Gifted Education Mandates].
233. See Kautz, supra note 137, at 703, 717-18.
234. See 22 PA. CODE § 16.31(a) (2019); Kautz, supra note 137, at 699-702.
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B. How Can GIEPs Assist Twice-Exceptional Students?
Using a GIEP to ensure that a twice-exceptional student is re-
ceiving an appropriate education may seem counterintuitive. After
all, if the student is regressing or declining academically, how is
specialized gifted education going to support him? The question is
a good one, yet it ignores a crucial fact about twice-exceptional
students. Namely, these students’ gifts and deficits are intertwined
and, without a holistic understanding of the student (his strengths
and his weaknesses), he may not make appropriate progress.235
Consider a student with a specific learning disability. Perhaps the
student excels in reading comprehension but cannot write profi-
ciently. According to Endrew, this twice-exceptional student’s IEP
should consider the student as an individual, clarify where the
student struggles, and develop goals to help the student progress in
that area.236 Since the student struggles in writing, the student’s
IEP goal may read as follows: “When given a topic, the student will
use complete sentences with 80 percent accuracy in four out of five
trials.” Additionally, the student may receive services, such as pull-
out instruction, where a special education teacher remediates cer-
tain writing skills. These measures will help the student overcome
his writing deficit. While focusing on this writing goal, however, it
is possible that the student may experience regression in his area
of strength—reading comprehension.237 This is especially likely if
the student is placed or grouped in a lower-level class that matches
his writing ability or if the student’s teachers do not challenge the
student appropriately.238
235. TWICE EXCEPTIONAL GUIDEBOOK, supra note 1, at D-1, D-2, F-2; Marcy J. Douglass,
Twice-Exceptional: Gifted Students with Learning Disabilities Considerations Packet (Carol
Tieso ed., 2008), WM. & MARY TRAINING & TECH. ASSISTANCE CTR. (Apr. 2008), https://
education.wm.edu/centers/ttac/documents/packets/twiceexceptional.pdf [https://perma.cc/
R64S-5KZ7].
236. See supra Part I.C.2.
237. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
238. See Barbara Jackson Gilman et al., Critical Issues in the Identification of Gifted
Students with Co-Existing Disabilities: The Twice-Exceptional, SAGE OPEN, July-Sept. 2013,
at 11-12 (July-Sept. 2013); Office for Exceptional Children, Identifying and Serving Twice
Exceptional Children: Best Practices and the Bottom Line, OHIO DEP’T EDUC. (Feb. 29, 2016),
https:// education.ohio.gov/getattachment/Topics/Other-Resources/Gifted-Education/Teaching-
Gifted-Students-in-Ohio/Presentations-on-Gifted-Children/Twice-Exceptional-2016.pdf.aspx
[https://perma.cc/XK4D-G298] [hereinafter Best Practices] (noting that twice-exceptional
2020] ENDREW ’S IMPACT ON TWICE-EXCEPTIONAL STUDENTS 879
By supplementing this student’s IEP with a GIEP, it is possible
that the student’s strengths can also be addressed, allowing the
student’s education to truly focus on his “unique circumstances.”239
While the student receives writing remediation via his IEP, he could
also, per his GIEP, be placed in enrichment activities, pull-out
instruction with a gifted teacher, or online instruction to ensure that
his reading comprehension abilities do not stagnate. Though the
exact mix of supports and services may vary, what is clear is that,
with a GIEP and IEP, the twice-exceptional student can actually
receive what Endrew promised: appropriate progress throughout the
curriculum.240 This sentiment is mentioned in a Philadelphia City
School District case that described the interaction between a
student’s GIEP and IEP:
[O]ne of the remarkable characteristics of the IEP and GIEP is
how craftily the district has weaved specialized education across
Student’s entire regular and gifted education programs, assuring
the very structure and continuity Student requires ... while
remaining fluid enough to identify and accommodate the ever
changing intellectual, emotional, and social needs unique to
Student as an individual.241
It is important to briefly recognize that adding a GIEP will not
necessarily result in a wholly “equal” education and may still not
provide a student with the ability to maximize his potential.242 In
fact, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, when analyzing GIEPs,
came to the same conclusion as federal courts analyzing IEPs,
stating that a GIEP’s implementation does not imply that a student
will receive the best, most desirable education.243 Rather, the
addition of a GIEP, like an IEP, helps provide a twice-exceptional
student with the opportunity to make appropriate progress through-
students may experience regression if not taught appropriately).
239. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 1001 (2017).
240. See Kautz, supra note 137, at 719-20.
241. See Student v. Phila. City Sch. Dist., 106 LRP 20576, at 5 (Pa. State Educ. Agency
Sept. 8, 2003).
242. See Centennial Sch. Dist. v. Commonwealth Dep't of Educ., 539 A.2d 785, 791 (Pa.
1988) (“[GIEPs] need not ‘maximize’ the student’s ability.”).
243. See id.
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out the curriculum.244 Additionally, a GIEP could help ensure that
the student’s progress in one academic area is not stymied by a
weakness in another academic area.245
Moreover, the addition of the GIEP helps promote the general
purpose of the IDEIA (and prior special education laws).246 The
EAHCA, a predecessor of the current IDEIA, was originally enacted
to prevent disabled students from “sitting idly in [the] classroom[ ]
awaiting the time when they were old enough to ‘drop out.’”247
Studies of twice-exceptional students show that without instruction
that addresses their needs holistically, they are at an increased risk
of growing frustrated, developing behavior problems, and even drop-
ping out.248 Thus, implementing a GIEP requirement that helps
meet these students’ needs only further serves the original purpose
of special education law.249 
C. Implementing GIEPs
To give GIEP provisions legally binding force, and to best help
twice-exceptional students, state legislatures should incorporate the
provisions into their current education laws. Several states have
GIEP provisions in their state codes.250 Such provisions could be
used as model legislation. Of these several provisions, Pennsylva-
nia’s is perhaps the most comprehensive and has been praised by
commentators and parents.251 Thus, a state seeking to utilize and
incorporate GIEPs into its current education laws should model its
state laws after Pennsylvania Code section 16.32. Section 16.32
details, among other things, (1) what a GIEP must include, (2) what
rights attach to a GIEP, and (3) what timeline schools must follow
when preparing and implementing GIEPs.252
244. See Kautz, supra note 137, at 701.
245. See Best Practices, supra note 238.
246. See supra Part I.B.2.
247. Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 191
(1982).
248. Millman, supra note 30, at 456-57; see also TWICE-EXCEPTIONAL DILEMMA, supra note
3, at 15.
249. See supra Part I.B.2.
250. See Gifted Education Mandates, supra note 232.
251. See Kautz, supra note 137, at 703-04, 716-20.
252. See 22 PA. CODE § 16.32(d)-(g) (2019).
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Pennsylvania’s gifted education provisions constitute an entire,
independent chapter within the state code.253 This means that,
unlike some states, Pennsylvania’s gifted provisions are not
embedded within the state’s general education provisions or within
the state’s special education provisions.254 Thus, a state could easily
append a similar GIEP provision to its current gifted education laws
or education laws generally. Furthermore, a state could easily tailor
the Pennsylvania provisions to meet its unique needs.
Once GIEP legislation is in place, actual implementation of the
law would be relatively simple. Since GIEPs are functionally and
substantively similar to IEPs, implementation would not be difficult
for a state’s schools.255 All states currently receive IDEIA funding.256
This means that all states are responsible for following the IDEIA
provisions, including the implementation of IEPs.257 Thus, since
schools are already familiar with IEPs, there should be little
confusion if GIEP provisions are adopted by a state legislature.
D. Potential Issues
Adding GIEPs to a state’s laws could certainly help many twice-
exceptional students. Yet, despite this, there are several reasons
why a state may choose not to enact GIEP laws. These reasons could
include (1) the expense of implementing such legislation and (2) a
general lack of concern for twice-exceptional students. 
First, costs may bar state implementation of GIEPs. Though the
writing and creation of the GIEP document is not expensive, the
services and accommodations promised in such a document could be
costly.258 Screening students for eligibility, creating enrichment
opportunities, and providing access to online education, among
other things, could prove to be expensive; likewise, any procedural
safeguards created in GIEP legislation could prove expensive,
especially if parents frequently exercise these rights.259 These costs
253. Gifted provisions are included in Title 22, Chapter 16 of the Pennsylvania Code. See
generally id. § 16.
254. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-152 (2019).
255. See Kautz, supra note 137, at 701.
256. See IDEA PRIMER, supra note 47, at 17-18.
257. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2012).
258. See IDEA PRIMER, supra note 47, at 4.
259. See id.
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are likely to be noticeable, especially if a state does not already fund
gifted education.260
Though these concerns are legitimate, especially given that gifted
education, unlike special education, is not federally funded, costs
need not be exorbitant. The exact language of a state’s GIEP
provisions would determine the cost, and the costs could be tailored
state-by-state. In an effort to reduce costs, states could decide to
limit the number of students eligible for a GIEP. In other words, a
state with a broad, generalized definition of giftedness could adjust
its current provisions to require that a student demonstrate certain
test scores or achievements.261 Importantly, narrowing the definition
of giftedness could exclude some twice-exceptional students who fail
to meet the statutory requirements.262 However, a state hoping to
benefit twice-exceptional students specifically could easily over-
come this by writing a separate definition of giftedness for students
qualifying under the IDEIA. Alternatively, states could limit GIEP
provisions solely to twice-exceptional students by requiring IDEIA
eligibility in order to qualify under GIEP provisions.263 Though
perhaps less effective, a state could also limit costs without cutting
the number of eligible students by restricting the types of accommo-
dations and services it offers or by limiting students’ causes of
action under GIEP provisions.
Additionally, states could design GIEP provisions with their cur-
rent laws in mind. Currently, over two-thirds of states mandate
gifted education in some form.264 Thus, these states could likely
tailor GIEP legislation in a way that utilizes the programs and
policies that these states have already designed. Likewise, approxi-
mately two-thirds of the states either partially or fully fund gifted
260. See Support for Gifted Programs, supra note 135 (listing states that do not fund gifted
education).
261. Definitions of giftedness vary state-by-state. Compare ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4,
§ 52.890 (2019), with Gifted and Talented Defined, ME. EDUCATORS GIFTED & TALENTED,
http:// megat.org/gifted-in-maine/ [https://perma.cc/2K2V-V78X].
262. This is especially true since many twice-exceptional students’ disabilities mask their
gifts. See Millman, supra note 30, at 478.
263. As the Pennsylvania GIEP provisions are written, all gifted students—twice-
exceptional and traditionally gifted—are eligible. See 22 PA. CODE § 16.21 (2019).
264. See Support for Gifted Programs, supra note 135.
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education.265 These states could redesign their current spending in
a way that comports with GIEP legislation.
Second, a general lack of concern for twice-exceptional students
could lead a state not to implement GIEP provisions.266 This lack of
concern is generally steeped in either a lack of awareness or a belief
that gifted students generally do not need support, regardless of
their disabilities.267 Unfortunately, these beliefs may be difficult to
overcome. Yet, since every state implements the IDEIA and, there-
fore, has some interest in serving America’s special education
students, it would stand to reason that states would be willing to
fully support this subset of students as well.
E. Alternative Strategies
As previously mentioned, GIEP legislation does not offer a perfect
solution for twice-exceptional students.268 Though there are perhaps
options that could better serve twice-exceptional students, these
options are either unrealistic or present the same challenges
described above.269 Nevertheless, for comparative purposes, some
alternative solutions will briefly be discussed.
Another way to serve twice-exceptional students would be to
amend the IDEIA and include either giftedness (or twice-
exceptionality) as a disability category.270 As of now, the IDEIA does
not explicitly identify either.271 If giftedness were recognized as a
category, the courts may demand that schools accommodate more
than mere grade-to-grade progress.272 The fact is, however, that
giftedness is unlikely to be recognized as a category. Special
education law has recognized the same thirteen categories since
265. See id.
266. See Christensen, supra note 32, at 73.
267. See Miller, supra note 117, at 95-99.
268. See supra Part III.D.
269. See supra Part III.D.
270. This solution could be preferable to the implementation of GIEPs since leaving GIEP
implementation to the states would create a nationwide patchwork of regulations related to
twice-exceptional students.
271. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (2012).
272. This is, of course, speculative. It is possible that the addition of “giftedness” or “twice-
exceptionality” as an IDEIA category would, beyond student identification, result in few
practical changes.
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1990.273 And, based on the legislative history of the IDEIA, which
appeared to prioritize the lowest-functioning disabled students, it
is unlikely that giftedness will be recognized in the near future.274
Some states, however, have incorporated giftedness as an
eligibility category within their special education law.275 Unfortu-
nately, the effect of these statutes on twice-exceptional students is
difficult to determine since, at the time of this writing, there are no
published cases fully examining how twice-exceptional students are
treated under such provisions. The effect would likely be similar to
GIEP provisions in Pennsylvania, where a twice-exceptional
student’s GIEP and IEP are merged into one cohesive document.276
It would appear that a state that has giftedness as an eligibility
category would do the same. There are two drawbacks to this
approach, however. First, states would have a more difficult time
narrowing gifted education provisions since, presumably, gifted-
ness would be treated like all other eligibility categories. This, as
previously mentioned, may increase costs.277 Second, states using
this approach most likely use Endrew and Rowley as guidelines for
their gifted provisions. This may mean that the level of progress
would be no different than how twice-exceptional students are cur-
rently treated under federal law.278
Compared to these possible approaches, using a GIEP provision
to ensure twice-exceptional students’ needs are met provides per-
haps the most workable solution for the states. Unlike the alterna-
tive approaches briefly discussed here, GIEP provisions permit state
courts the freedom to interpret and expand gifted provisions beyond
what is allowed in Endrew.
CONCLUSION
While the Endrew decision positively affected special education
students on the whole, the decision’s impact on twice-exceptional
273. Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, § 101(a),
104 Stat. 1103, 1103.
274. See Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 180-
83 (1982).
275. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-152 (2019).
276. See Kautz, supra note 137, at 703-04.
277. See supra Part III.D.
278. This is speculative since cases from these states are not published.
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students is less clear. As of this writing, the impact on twice-
exceptional students has been minimal—unless a school district
clearly fails to recognize a student’s twice-exceptional nature.279 It
appears, however, that the Endrew decision will fail to bring about
substantial change or live up to some advocates’ expectations. The
language of the decision, its adherence to Rowley, and fairness
concerns all suggest this.280
Even if Endrew fails to bring about monumental change, states
can still better serve their twice-exceptional student populations.
State-based provisions, such as Gifted Individualized Education
Plans, can help twice-exceptional students by addressing their gifts
and weaknesses collectively and by ensuring that these students
receive an “appropriately ambitious” education.281
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